INTRODUCTION
We feel that in a complex agent society, an agent will need to work with other agents that have a variety of different organizational relationships with it. The agent's attitude toward negotiation with such agents is not simply either competing or cooperative, the agent needs to qualitatively reason about each negotiation session, e.g., how important its own outcome is compared to the other agents' outcomes, so it can choose an appropriate negotiation strategy. Figure 1 describes this dual concern model [3] . When the agent attaches importance only to its own outcome, its attitude toward negotiation is competitive (self-interested); when an agent attaches the same degree of importance to its own outcome as it does to the outcomes of the other agent, its attitude is cooperative; when the agent attaches more importance to the outcomes of other agents and no importance to its own outcome, its attitude is accommodative; if the agent attaches no importance to any outcomes, its attitude is avoidant (the negotiation is not worth its time and effort). Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. model, we find that there are potentially many options between the two extremes of self-interested and cooperative.
In this paper, we present an integrative mechanism that enables an agent to qualitatively manage its attitude towards each negotiation session. This mechanism is not purely self-interested or purely cooperative, but supports ranges of these behaviors so that the agent can reason about how cooperative it should be. This mechanism is based on the Motivational Quantities (MQ) framework [5] .
INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION
The motivational qualities(MQ) [5] framework provides an agent with the capability to reason about different goals in an open, dynamic and large-scale Multi-Agent System (MAS), hence the agent can evaluate a negotiation issue from an organizational perspective. Let's use task allocation as an example of negotiation where for each task t allocated to agent B, from agent A, certain MQs are transferred from agent A to agent B. The conceptual model here is that agent B is motivated by the potential increase in its MQs to perform tasks for agent A (note that this does not convert the MQs to currency as not all agents may be interested in said MQs).
In terms of specifics, there are two types of MQs that could be transferred with the successful accomplishment of task t: goal related MQs and relational MQs. These classes are conceptual and used to clearly differentiate motivations for task performance based on attitudes toward specific negotiations -in reality, they are both simply MQs. Goal related MQs are associated with an agent's organizational goals and generally increases in MQ volume have positive benefits to the agent's utility. In this sense, agent B's performance of task t is motivated by "self-interested" reasons if payment is via a goal related MQ. For example, task t has 3 units of MQ x transferred with it, and for agent B, the utility curve of MQ x is: u(x) = 2x, that means, the utility of agent B will increase by 6 units by collecting 3 units of MQ x through performing task t. Agent B decides whether to accept task t by reasoning about its value relative to the cost of the resources it will expend in the performance of t. In this case, as the task doesn't consume any MQs, the resource expenditure is in terms of time or opportunity cost. Because this reasoning process pertains to goal related MQs, it is "self-interested", for the agent's only concern is its own utility increase. Suppose that by having task t accomplished, agent A's own utility increases by 20 units. If agent B takes this fact into consideration when it makes its decision about task t, agent B is cooperative with agent A because agent B is also concerned about agent A's outcome (in addition to its own). If we want agent B to consider A's utility, we need to introduce another MQ designed to model B's (revised) preference for A to have a utility increase also. To reflect B's attitude toward A's outcome, we introduce a relational MQ, the preference for which represents how cooperative agent B is with agent A concerning task t. Let Å É Ø be the relational MQ transferred from agent A to agent B when agent B performs task t for agent A. Since Å É Ø is a relational MQ, its only purpose is to measure the relationship between agents A and B. While agent B may actually have an organizational goal to accumulate Å É s of this type, in this paper, for simplicity of presentation, we will assume that agent B does not have an organizational level goal to cooperate with agent A. Accordingly, when measuring the utility of agent B toward problem solving, we will not consider the utility produced by any relational MQs such as Å É Ø . Likewise with agent A. When agent A transfers Å É Ø to agent B, we will not tabulate the negative change in utility of agent A because the change in utility is not related to problem solving progress but is instead related to the transfer of a relational MQ. The reason for this approach is that in this paper our performance metric is social welfare as it is conventionally used, which is in terms of progress toward joint goals. From this view, the utility produced by a relational MQ can be seen as virtual utility. Though Å É Ø produces virtual utility, it is important because it carries the information of how important task t is for agent A and makes it possible for agent B to consider agent A's outcome when it makes its own decisions.
Actually, how Å É Ø is mapped into agent B's (virtual) utility, meaning utility that is not included in the social welfare computation depends on how cooperative agent B is with agent A. Suppose that 20 units Å É Ø are transferred with task Ø, representing the utility agent A gained by having agent B perform task Ø, transferred to agent B. The mapping function could also be a nonlinear function (d) that describes a more complicated attitude of agent B to agent A, i.e., agent B being fully cooperative with agent A for some period and then becoming self-interested. An agent can adjust the utility mapping function to reflect its relationship with another agent, which could be its administrator, colleague, friend, client or competitor. By adjusting some parameters in the mapping function, more subtle relationships could be managed. The agent could differentiate a friendly colleague from an unfriendly colleague, also it could draw distinctions between a best friend and an ordinary friend.
Different from the goal related MQs, which are built by the agent's designer and whose utility curves are not changing, the utility curves of the relational MQs can be adjusted by the agent dynamically to reflect its dynamic relationships with other agents. The agent's attitude towards another agent could be "issue-specific"; given that an agent could play multiple roles, there could be different issues negotiated between agents, and the agents should select a different attitude according to what issue is negotiated. For example, for the colleague's request to contribute to a shared professional job and for the same colleague's request for a ride, even though both requests come from the same agent, the agent's attitude could be different.
RELATED WORK
Glass and Grosz [2] developed a measure of social consciousness called "brownie points" (BP). A parameter ÈÛ Ø can be adjusted to create agents with varying levels of social consciousness. Their work assumes there is a central mechanism controlling the assignment of group tasks according to an agent's rank, which is not always appropriated for an open agent environment. Axelrod's work [1] and Sen's work [4] on reciprocity have shown stable cooperative behavior can arise when self-interested agents adopt a reciprocating attitude toward each other. The idea of the reciprocity is related to our work if the relational MQ is used in bi-direction between agents, the relational MQ actually works as a quantitative measure of reciprocity. A more detailed description about this work is available from [6] .
